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THE CASE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL EASEMENT 
APPROACH TO PERMANENT MONUMENTS IN 
TRADITIONAL PUBLIC FORUMS 
Paul E. McGreal* 
Imagine that you are mayor of a small town that has a picturesque pub-
lic park, removed from the town center, where your residents come to es-
cape the hustle and bustle of everyday life.  To make the space inviting, you 
have built a gazebo, a picnic area, and a playground for the local children.  
You have also allowed a local veterans group to erect a permanent monu-
ment honoring those from the town who died in war.  Then, a local group 
asks permission to hold a political rally in the park.  You deny the request, 
explaining that the park is for peaceful recreation and not for noisy demon-
strations. 
By denying the political rally, you have violated the First Amendment.  
The First Amendment severely limits the government‘s power to place con-
tent-based restrictions on speech in traditional public forums, which the 
Court defines as public parks, streets, and other ―places which by long tra-
dition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.‖1  
Further, government may not ban speech activities in such forums.  Thus, 
your town must allow at least some assembly and debate in the park. 
Next, a local religious group asks permission to place a permanent mo-
nument in the park.  They explain that the monument will display the cen-
tral tenets of their faith, which they consider their equivalent of the Ten 
Commandments.  You deny this request and explain that the only perma-
nent structures allowed are those that serve the park‘s recreational purpose.  
The religious group points out, however, that you have already allowed 
placement of a veterans monument.  You respond that a war memorial is a 
more appropriate message for a public park than a religious monument.  
The religious group catches your slip here.  They explain that the park is a 
traditional public forum, and that you are excluding their speech (the mo-
nument) from that forum (the park) based on its content (a religious monu-
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exclude the religious monument violates the First Amendment.  Incredul-
ous, you object that a permanent monument must be different than more 
temporary speech, such as a rally or movable display.  After all, if the city 
had to accept every monument offered by a private group, the park would 
soon look like a graveyard peppered with headstones.  The religious group 
persists.  Are they right? 
This November, the Supreme Court will hear arguments on this ques-
tion in City of Pleasant Grove v. Summum.2  The precise issue is whether 
placement of a permanent monument is part of the public‘s right to use a 
traditional public forum.  This question falls in a gap in current public fo-
rum doctrine, and the lower courts have reached conflicting results in apply-
ing that doctrine.  On the one hand, the Tenth Circuit held in City of 
Pleasant Grove that permanent monuments are within the public‘s right to 
use a traditional public forum.  This ruling bars the government from regu-
lating private monuments based on their content, effectively leaving a 
choice between allowing all or no such monuments.  On the other hand, 
other courts have held that the public‘s right to use a traditional public fo-
rum does not include placement of permanent structures.3  These courts typ-
ically announce the rule as a matter of judicial fiat, offering little, if any, 
reasoning.4  Their logic is internally inconsistent and, if applied generally, 
would lead to unacceptable consequences. 
Both of the lower court approaches ultimately prove unsatisfactory be-
cause the decisions lack a principled basis to distinguish temporary speech 
from permanent monuments.  This is not surprising given that the Supreme 
Court‘s existing public forum doctrine provides no basis for doing so.  The 
lower courts, then, have been trapped in the current doctrinal box. 
This Essay looks outside the current public forum framework to pro-
pose a new approach built on an analogy to the real property law of ease-
ments.  Under this view, courts should treat the public‘s right to use a 
traditional public forum as if it were a constitutional easement over gov-
ernment property.  As with any easement, a private citizen must not use her 
constitutional easement in a manner that ―unreasonably interferes‖ with the 
government‘s use of its property or the use rights of other members of the 
public.  This Essay asserts that a permanent monument would unreasonably 
interfere by indefinitely excluding both the land owner (i.e., the govern-
ment) and the other easement holders (i.e., other members of the public) 
from use of the occupied land.  Thus, the public does not have a right to 
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This Essay has four Parts.  Part I outlines the Supreme Court‘s current 
public forum doctrine.  Part II critiques the prevailing lower court ap-
proaches to permanent monuments in traditional public forums, and finds 
them wanting.  Part III builds a new test—the constitutional easement ap-
proach—drawing an analogy to the real property law of easements.  Part IV 
then explains why the constitutional easement approach best balances the 
competing interests of the government and the public in a traditional public 
forum. 
I. CURRENT PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court‘s First Amendment free speech analysis recogniz-
es three types of government property: traditional public forums, designated 
public forums, and nonpublic forums.  Traditional public forums are ―plac-
es which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to as-
sembly and debate.‖5  Such forums include public streets and parks,6 but not 
locations, such as airports and prisons,7 that lack such a tradition. 
First and foremost, the government may not close a traditional public 
forum to speech.8  For regulations short of a complete ban, the proper con-
stitutional test depends on the type of government action.  If the govern-
ment limits speech based on its content, then the government must show 
that its action is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.9  If the restric-
tion is content-neutral, the government action must be ―narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication.‖10  Content-neutral regulations include limits 
on the times (e.g., no amplified sound after 10 p.m.), places (e.g., protests 
only in designated portions of a public park), and manner (e.g., no fire-
works) of speech activities.11 
Government property that is not a traditional public forum is, by de-
fault, a nonpublic forum.  The government may, however, convert a non-
public forum into a designated public forum by permitting public use for 
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traditional public forum because the public has not historically had access 
to the lunchrooms, classrooms, and the like.  But a school district could 
create a designated public forum by opening the high school‘s gymnasium 
to the public on evenings and weekends.12  The government must intention-
ally open the property ―for expressive use by the general public or by a par-
ticular class of speakers.‖13  Allowing only selective access to the property 
does not create a designated public forum.14  And even if the government 
creates a designated public forum, it may later close the forum to expressive 
activity.  While the designated public forum is open, however, speech re-
strictions are subject to the same constitutional tests that apply to a tradi-
tional public forum.15 
Government property that is neither a traditional nor a designated pub-
lic forum is treated as a nonpublic forum.  Regulations of speech in nonpub-
lic forums must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.  Reasonable regula-
regulations ―preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is 
lawfully dedicated.‖16  So, for example, a rule that library patrons must not 
speak above a whisper preserves the forum—the public library—for its ded-
icated use—a place for reading and quiet reflection. 
II. PREVAILING APPROACHES TO PLACEMENT OF PUBLIC 
MONUMENTS 
Because City of Pleasant Grove v. Summum will be before the Su-
preme Court this Term, it is worth using that case to illustrate the lower 
court approaches to the permanent monument issue.  In 1971, the city had 
accepted a Ten Commandments monument donated by the local chapter of 
the Fraternal Order of Eagles.  The monument was set for permanent dis-
play in the city park, along with ―a number of buildings, artifacts, and per-
manent displays.‖17  Twenty-two years later, members of the Summum 
religion requested that the city place a monument displaying the Seven 
Aphorisms of Summum in that same park.18  The monument would be about 
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  City of Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. 
Ct. 1737 (2008). 
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  Brief for Respondent at 1, City of Pleasant Grove v. Summum, No. 07-665 (U.S. Aug. 15, 2008) 
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transfigures the individual.‘‖ (quoting The Teachings of Summum are the Teachings of Gnostic Christi-
naty, available at http://www.summum.us/philosophy/gnosticism.shtml (visited Aug. 15, 2008)), avail-
able at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-665_Respondent.pdf (link). 
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jected the proposed Summum monument because its content was inconsis-
tent with the park‘s current use.19  Summum brought suit, and the district 
court denied their First Amendment claim.20 
All parties and all courts to address the issue have agreed that the city 
park, as a whole, is a traditional public forum.21  The question, then, is 
whether placement of a permanent monument falls within the public‘s right 
to use a traditional public forum.  On appeal, a panel of the Tenth Circuit 
held that the public does have such a right, and the full court denied Sum-
mum‘s motion for rehearing en banc.  The en banc denial generated three 
opinions that succinctly state three approaches to the permanent monument 
issue: two separate opinions by Judges McConnell and Lucero, who dis-
sented from the Tenth Circuit‘s denial of rehearing en banc; and an opinion 
by Judge Tacha, author of the panel opinion, responding to Judges McCon-
nell and Lucero. 
A. Permanent Monuments Allowed 
Judge Tacha broadly defined the public‘s rights in a traditional public 
forum: 
[T]he Supreme Court has never distinguished between transitory and perma-
nent expression for purposes of forum analysis.  In fact, this distinc-
tion . . . lacks the support of both precedent and logic.  If a city allows a private 
message to be heard in a public park, why would the permanent nature of the 
expression limit the First Amendment scrutiny we apply?22 
The nature of the activity, then, does not affect the analysis.  The mere 
fact that a public park is a traditional public forum triggers the proper First 
Amendment test.  Here, because the city concededly refused the Seven 
Aphorisms monument based on its content, strict scrutiny applied.  The city 
lost because it had not demonstrated that its asserted ―interest in promoting 
its history‖ was compelling.23  Further, even if the city had shown a compel-
ling interest, such as public safety, it could not plausibly claim that the con-





  See Summum, 483 F.3d at 1047.  The parties dispute the city‘s actual motive in refusing the Sev-
en Aphorisms monument.  The city claims that the park is reserved for monuments honoring the city‘s 
history, and Summum claims that the city simply disapproved of the Summum religion.  In Part III, I 
discuss what reasons would be acceptable under this Essay‘s proposed approach. 
20
  Id. at 1048. 
21
  See, e.g., Summum v. Pleasant City Grove, 499 F.3d 1170, 1172–73 (10th Cir. 2007) (Lucero, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1175 (McConnell, J., dissenting from denial of re-
hearing en banc); id. at 1178–79 (Tacha, J., response to dissent from denial of rehearing en banc). 
22
  Id. at 1178 (Tacha, J., response to dissent from denial of rehearing en banc). 
23
  Summum, 483 F.3d at 1053. 
24
  See id. at 1054–55 (―We need not decide whether the city‘s interests in aesthetics and safety are 
compelling because the resolution is not narrowly tailored to achieve its stated interests.‖). 
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There are three problems with Judge Tacha‘s approach.  First, despite 
her claim to the contrary, logic does support a distinction between transitory 
and permanent speech in a traditional public forum.  A permanent display 
forever reduces the space available to both the city and the remainder of the 
public to make use of the traditional public forum.  In doing so, the perma-
nent monument diminishes the rights of other parties to the traditional pub-
lic forum.  In terms of the property metaphor of the bundle of sticks,25 Judge 
Tacha‘s approach assigns the monument owner the stick of ―exclusive right 
to use,‖ and does so to the exclusion of the government and other members 
of the public.  Judge Tacha does not explain why the proponent of a perma-
nent monument ought to receive this uniquely valuable right. 
Second, Judge Tacha‘s approach forces the government into an all or 
nothing position.  She explains that while the public may not have a right to 
erect a permanent display in a park bereft of monuments, the right arises as 
soon as the government ―permit[s] the permanent display of a private mes-
sage.‖26  If the government wants to deny permanent monuments based on 
content, its only practical option is to close its traditional public forums to 
permanent monuments.  Otherwise, the government must open its public 
parks27 to monuments from all manner of groups, including the Ku Klux 
Klan and other hate groups.  Judge Tacha never explains why we should ac-
cept a result that flies in the face of over two hundred years of practice. 
Third, Judge Tacha‘s approach, followed to its logical conclusion, 
would give the public a right to place permanent monuments in an other-
wise empty traditional public forum.  This right would flow from equating 
transitory and permanent displays.  Under current First Amendment doc-
trine, the right to speak and assemble in a public park is triggered by the na-
ture of the forum, and not by the government‘s decision to let one group use 
the park for speech.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has unequivocally stated 
that the government must keep a traditional public forum open to speech ac-
tivities.28  If permanent displays are to be treated the same as transitory ac-
tivities, then, the simple fact that a park is a traditional public forum would 





  See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (―A common idiom describes property as a 
‗bundle of sticks‘—a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute proper-
ty.‖) (link). 
26
  Summum, 499 F.3d at 1179 n.1 (denial of rehearing en banc). 
27
  Cities surely have a compelling interest from keeping permanent monuments from their streets 
and sidewalks: public safety.  See Madsen v. Women‘s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) 
(link).  Consequently, the problem really arises only for public parks. 
28
  Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
29
  In dicta, four Justices have stated that the public does not have such a right.  See Capital Square 
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 783 (1995) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (joined by O‘Connor and Breyer, JJ.) (link); id. at 802–03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
Four other Justices stated that such a ban may be justified as a time, place, and manner restriction.  Id. at 
761 (Scalia, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (joined by Rehnquist, CJ. and Thomas and Ken-
nedy, JJ.).  In other contexts, however, the Court has held that a complete ban on general mode of 
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cha blinked at accepting this implication of her reasoning, claiming that her 
approach applies ―even if we accept the view that a speaker does not have a 
constitutional right to erect a permanent display in a public forum.‖30  Her 
opinion, however, provides no basis for this assurance. 
B. Permanent Monuments Are Government Speech 
Judge McConnell would hold that a permanent monument becomes 
government speech the moment that the government allows the private dis-
play onto public property.  He reasons, that by deciding which permanent 
monuments to allow, ―[i]t follows that any messages conveyed by the mo-
numents [that the government officials] have chosen to display are ‗gov-
ernment speech.‘‖31  Thus, because the First Amendment free speech 
guarantee does not limit government speech,32 the decision whether to place 
the monument is no longer subject to traditional public forum analysis.33 
There are three problems with Judge McConnell‘s approach.  First, 
factually speaking, Judge McConnell overstates his case.  Simply accepting 
a permanent monument does not necessarily endorse the monument‘s mes-
sage.  Indeed, the point of placing a permanent monument could be to stir 
debate on an issue, in which case the government remains studiously agnos-
tic about the monument‘s message.  For example, the government could 
place permanent sculptures in a public park to give the public free access to 
works of art, without endorsing any artist‘s message. 
Second, because Judge McConnell‘s logic does not distinguish perma-
nent and transitory speech activities, his approach is in tension with the en-
tire concept of a traditional public forum.  Recall that Judge McConnell 
believes that the government‘s decision to allow a monument in a public 
park effectively converts the monument‘s message into government speech.  
This logic, however, applies equally to temporary speech or displays al-
lowed in a public park.  Consequently, all speech activity in a public park is 
government, not private, speech.  Judge McConnell‘s logic, then, contra-
dicts the very idea of a traditional public park as a place where private 
speakers assemble and debate.  
Third, placing such a hair trigger on government speech creates a col-
lateral problem under the Establishment Clause.  For example, if simply ac-
cepting a Ten Commandments monument is enough for the content of the 
monument to become government speech, such action would seem to 
                                                                                                                           
speech, such as yard signs and handbilling, violates the First Amendment.  See, e.g., City of Ladue v. 
Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994) (link); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162–163 (1939) (link); Martin v. 
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145–47 (1943) (link). 
30
  Summum, 499 F.3d at 1179 n.1 (denial of rehearing en banc). 
31
  Id. at 1175. 
32
  See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass‘n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (link). 
33
  Government speech that endorses religion may still run afoul of the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment.  See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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present a straightforward endorsement of specific religious beliefs.  The 
Court has held that such government endorsement violates the Establish-
ment Clause.34  Judge McConnell‘s solution to the public forum problem 
would create an Establishment Clause problem, at least for religious themed 
permanent monuments.35  This flies in the face of the Supreme Court‘s re-
cent decision that such monuments do not necessarily violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.36 
C. Changing the Forum 
Judge Lucero altered traditional public forum analysis by changing 
how courts define the forum at issue.  The prevailing approach is to define 
the forum as the location in question—public park, street, sidewalk, airport 
etc.—and then ask whether that place is a traditional public forum.  Judge 
Lucero redefined the forum to include both the location and the requested 
use.  So, instead of asking whether the city park was a traditional public fo-
rum (which it clearly was), Judge Lucero asked whether ―permanent mo-
numents in the city parks‖ was such a forum.37  He could then plausibly 
conclude that the United States does not have a ―long tradition‖—from time 
immemorial—of allowing private parties to place monuments in public 
parks. 
There are three problems with defining a proposed traditional public 
forum with reference to the requested use as well as the location.  First, the 
Supreme Court has never taken this approach.38  Neither Supreme Court 
case cited by Judge Lucero addressed a traditional public forum, such as a 
park or street.39  Further, the Court‘s decision in International Society for 
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee40 (ISKCON) implicitly rejects such an ap-
proach.  There, the Court addressed restrictions on solicitation in a public 
airport.  The Court concluded that the airport was not a traditional public 
forum, and then applied lenient scrutiny in upholding the city‘s regulation.  
The Court could have redefined the forum to combine the location and the 





  See County of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (unattended crèche on courthouse 
steps sent message endorsing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause) (link). 
35
  The Establishment Clause problem would fall away if the Supreme Court adopted then-Professor 
McConnell‘s view that such government endorsements of religion are permissible.  See Michael 
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 187–94 (2002). 
36
  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (link). 
37
  Summum v. Pleasant City Grove, 499 F.3d 1170, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (denial 
of rehearing en banc). 
38
  Id. at 1178–79 & n.1 (Tacha, J., response to dissent from denial of rehearing en banc). 
39
  The two cited cases discuss whether a nontraditional public forum—teacher mailboxes in a public 
school and a government charity drive—should be treated as a designated public forum or a nonpublic 
forum.  Summum, 499 F.3d at 1172–73 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 49 (teacher mailboxes were a nonpub-
lic forum); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985) (federal gov-
ernment charitable solicitation material was a nonpublic forum)). 
40
  505 U.S. 672 (1992) (link). 
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defining the forum solely in terms of the location, the Court implicitly re-
jected Judge Lucero‘s combination approach.41 
Second, Judge Lucero‘s approach sows the seeds of its own undoing.  
Almost every use of a traditional public forum could be defined at such a 
specific level that no ―long tradition‖ of similar use exists.  For example, 
consider a political group that wishes to hold a rally in a public park that 
would use an LCD display and sound amplification equipment.  Under 
Judge Lucero‘s approach, the government could define the forum as ―a rally 
in a public park that makes use of an LCD display and sound amplification 
equipment.‖  Given that LCD displays and sound amplification equipment 
are of relatively recent origin,42 and are thus not supported by a long tradi-
tion, there would be no traditional public forum.  Of course, the political 
group could argue that the forum should be defined at a greater level of ab-
straction, such as ―political protest in a public park.‖  Judge Lucero, howev-
er, provides no rule or principle to determine the proper level of generality. 
Third, and more fundamentally, Judge Lucero‘s approach conflates the 
categories of traditional and designated public forums.  Recall that a desig-
nated public forum is government property that would otherwise be a non-
public forum, but that the government has opened to specified public uses.  
Consequently, the scope of a designated public forum, by definition, incor-
porates the speaker‘s use of the property.43  Conversely, the traditional pub-
lic forum is open generally to speech activities, and so the specific use does 
not define the forum.  Thus, by defining the relevant forum with reference 
to the requested use, Judge Lucero ignores the key distinction between tra-
ditional and designated public forums. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL EASEMENT APPROACH 
Part II showed that attempts to adapt existing public forum doctrine do 
not work.  Instead of further tinkering with current law, this Essay proposes 
a new test that looks outside the prevailing framework, drawing on an anal-
ogy to the real property law of easements.  This Part explains how the con-
stitutional easement approach would work. 
The Third Restatement of Servitudes defines an easement as ―a non-
possessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another and [that] 





  See also United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726–30 (1990) (focusing traditional public fo-
rum analysis on the location—sidewalk in front of the post office—without regard for the proposed 
use—soliciting contributions) (link). 
42
  One could argue that analogous technology existed at the time of either the Founding or ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court rejected such an approach in ISKCON.  See 505 U.S. at 
680.  There, the Court refused to analogize airports to other historical transportation nodes, such a bus 
and train stations. 
43
  Ark. Educ. Television Comm‘n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) (emphasis added) (link). 
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easement.‖44  An easement confers three main rights and obligations: first, 
the holder of the easement has a right to use property owned by another; 
second, the owner of the servient land must not unreasonably interfere with 
the easement holder‘s use; and third, the easement holder must not unrea-
sonably interfere with use by the servient owner.45  In a traditional public 
forum, members of the public are the easement holders, and the government 
is the servient owner.  The public, then, has the right to enter and use the 
traditional public forum, the government must not unreasonably interfere 
with that use, and the public must not unreasonably interfere with the gov-
ernment‘s continued ownership. 
Next, we must define the scope of the easement—that is, what uses the 
public‘s easement includes.  The Supreme Court‘s traditional public forum 
cases are instructive here.  Uniformly, the Court‘s opinions describe the 
public‘s right as one to use the forum for purposes of ―assembly and de-
bate.‖46  The Court has treated unattended temporary displays on public 
property as part of the speech and debate in a traditional public forum.47  
While this scope is somewhat imprecise, it will suffice for present purposes.  
Another aspect of the public‘s constitutional easement is relevant to the 
public‘s right to use a traditional public forum to erect a permanent monu-
ment: the right is nonexclusive, meaning that it is held by multiple parties 
(i.e., members of the public) simultaneously. 48  Restatement § 4.12 ad-
dresses the rights of simultaneous easement holders: ―[H]olders of separate 
servitudes creating rights to use the same property must exercise their rights 
so that they do not unreasonably interfere with each other.‖49  Courts have 
held that permanent structures can unreasonably interfere with a nonexclu-
sive easement.  For example, in Goss v. Johnson,50 a group of residents held 
an easement over the roads throughout their development.  To prevent the 
public from using these private roads as through streets to a highway, some 
residents constructed a barricade at the entrance to the development.  The 
court held that the barricade unreasonably interfered with the easement.51  





  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.2 (2000). 
45
  See id. §§ 4.9, 4.10. 
46
  See, e.g., Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass‘n v. Perry Local Educators‘ Ass‘n, 
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 781 (1995) 
(O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45) (link). 
47
  Pinette, 515 U.S. at 760–61 (unattended temporary display of a cross erected by the Ku Klux 
Klan was protected speech in a traditional public forum). 
48
  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.2 cmt. c. 
49
  Id. § 4.12 (2000) (emphasis added). 
50
  243 N.W.2d 590 (Iowa 1976). 
51
  Id. at 596. 
52
  561 P.2d 818 (Kan. 1977). 
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servient land owner unreasonably interfered with an easement for ingress 
and egress by building a carport over the right of way.53 
The analogy to the permanent monument context is straightforward.  
Members of the public simultaneously hold a constitutional easement to use 
a traditional public forum for assembly and debate.  This easement extends 
to all portions of the forum that are not reasonably used by the government 
to maintain the park.  As with the barricade and carport, a permanent mo-
nument would exclude others from making use of a portion of the constitu-
tional easement.  In the words of the Third Restatement, the permanent 
monument would ―unreasonably interfere‖ with use of the park by other 
constitutional easement holders—that is, by other members of the public. 
Placement of a permanent monument, then, is not part of the public‘s 
constitutional easement over a traditional public forum.  Further, ―perma-
nent monuments in the public park‖ would not be a designated public forum 
because the government gives private monuments selective—not general—
access to the park.54  This would leave the right to place a monument in the 
category of the public‘s right to use a nonpublic forum.  As discussed 
above, speech regulations in a nonpublic forum must be viewpoint neutral, 
and they must be reasonable.  Limits on placement of public monuments 
will surely be reasonable, in that they ―preserve the property under its con-
trol for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.‖55  Government maintains 
its parks to allow the public a place for recreation, entertainment, and other 
activities.  Because overcrowding with permanent structures would interfere 
with those purposes, a limit on monuments helps preserve the park for its 
intended use. 
The second requirement—that the regulation be viewpoint neutral—
places greater limits on the government.  In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund, Inc.,56 the Court explained that viewpoint neu-
trality is violated when the government ―denies access to a speaker solely to 
suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible sub-
ject.‖57  Cornelius illustrates how the government may take content-based 
action that is viewpoint neutral.  There, the Court considered a federal poli-
cy that barred advocacy groups from participating in a federal government 
charity drive.  The Court held that nonpublic forum analysis applied to the 
charity drive, and that barring advocacy groups was not impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination.58  The Court explained that the government‘s 





  Id. at 825. 
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  See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
55
  U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass‘ns, 453 U.S. 114, 130 (1981) (quoting 
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)) (link). 
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  473 U.S. 788 (1985) (link). 
57
  Id. at 806. 
58
  See id. at 806–11. 
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charity drive—was viewpoint neutral.  Of course, this asserted purpose 
must not ―conceal a bias against the viewpoint advanced by the excluded 
speakers.‖59 
The purpose described in Cornelius translates well to the public park 
context.  For example, a local government could plausibly claim that politi-
cally charged or inflammatory permanent monuments, and their attendant 
controversy, would make the park less inviting for its intended use by the 
entire community.  And while a controversial protest or rally might keep 
people away from the park temporarily, a controversial permanent monu-
ment would work an indefinite exclusion.  The government, however, must 
show that avoiding controversy is its actual purpose, and not simply a cover 
for disagreement with a speaker‘s message. 
Under the constitutional easements approach, the outcome of the Sum-
mum case would depend on the government‘s reason for excluding the Sev-
en Aphorisms‘ monument.  The City‘s asserted purpose was to promote its 
history by including only those permanent monuments either related to the 
City‘s history or donated by groups with strong community ties.60  Because 
this purpose concerns the topic of the monument and the identity of the do-
nor, it would be the type of viewpoint neutral reason permitted by Corne-
lius.  Conversely, if, as argued by Summum, the City‘s true purpose was to 
suppress the Summum‘s message, the City‘s decision would be unconstitu-
tional viewpoint discrimination.  This fact issue, which the Tenth Circuit 
did not decide, would control the outcome of the case.61 
IV. WHY ADOPT THE CONSTITUTIONAL EASEMENT APPROACH? 
The constitutional easement approach described in Part III has rhetori-
cal, functional, and doctrinal support in the Supreme Court‘s public forum 
decisions.  Rhetorically, the Court has consistently described traditional 
public forums as subject to a right of ―use of the public,‖ with such property 
having ―been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions.‖62  So, the Court‘s public 
forum cases already speak the language of easements. 
Functionally, it makes sense to treat the public‘s right to use a tradi-
tional public forum as a type of constitutional easement.  The law of ease-
ments defines the respective rights and responsibilities of the easement 
holder and the owner of the land burdened by the easement, as well as the 
rights and responsibilities among parties who simultaneously hold an ease-
ment in the same piece of land.  These rights and obligations aim to simul-





  Id. at 812. 
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  City of Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. 
Ct. 1737 (2008). 
61
  Id. at 1055 n.9. 
62
  Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (link). 
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Rights in the traditional public forum have the same structure as ease-
ments.  The traditional public forum has a land owner (the government) 
whose real property (the traditional public forum) is burdened by the right 
of third parties (the public) to use the property.  Also, the right to use is held 
by multiple easement owners (again, the public) concurrently.  The First 
Amendment public forum doctrine must balance the public‘s interest in us-
ing the traditional public forum with the government‘s interest in control-
ling its property as well as the interest of each member of the public to 
make the same use.  In other words, use by each member of the public is 
subject to both the government‘s right to continued use of the forum, as 
well as the right of other members of the public to make similar use.  This is 
the same functional balance sought by the law of easements. 
Doctrinally, the constitutional easement approach makes sense for two 
reasons.  First, there is precedent for resort to private property doctrines in 
implementing constitutional principles.  For example, in Dolan v. City of 
Tigard,63 the Court held that a property exaction64 is not a taking as long as 
it is roughly proportional to a legitimate government concern regarding the 
land.65  The Court borrowed the concept of rough proportionality from state 
zoning law, which provided a rich body of precedent to guide future deci-
sions.  Such use of established legal concepts has the twin benefit of guid-
ing judicial discretion, and increasing the predictability of judicial 
decisions. 
Second, the Court has adapted its public forum doctrine to specific 
government functions.  For example, when the government acts as a public 
broadcaster, the Court has tailored its analysis to the government‘s editorial 
role.66  Or when the government acts as a patron of the arts or a librarian, 
the public forum doctrine is tailored to those contexts.67  With a public park, 
the government is playing the role of landowner.  The constitutional ease-
ment approach tailors First Amendment doctrine to the government‘s rights 
and obligations as the owner of a traditional public forum. 
CONCLUSION 
Permanent monuments pose a puzzle for current public forum doctrine: 





  512 U.S. 374 (1994) (link). 
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  An exaction occurs when the government conditions the grant of approval on surrender of a prop-
erty right.  For example, in Dolan, the city approved proposed development plans in exchange for a pub-
lic easement and other concessions from the property owner.  Id. at 379–80. 
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  Id. at 391. 
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  See Ark. Educ. Television Comm‘n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672–75 (1998) (permitting the gov-
ernment‘s exercise of editorial judgment as a public broadcaster) (link). 
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  See United States v. American Library Ass‘n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (plurality opinion) 
(permitting the government as the operator of a public library to decide what materials are made availa-
ble to the public) (link); Nat‘l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585 (1998) (permitting 
the government to make decisions about art funding based on content) (link). 
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without causing doctrinal incoherence or unintended consequences?  Lower 
courts have bent and stretched the existing public forum rules in their at-
tempt to solve the puzzle, but without success.  This Essay finds its solution 
outside the current framework.  The analogy to easement law, and its rule 
against unreasonable interference with property rights, provides a principled 
basis for distinguishing permanent and temporary uses of property.  By 
thinking of the public‘s right to use a traditional public forum as a constitu-
tional easement, courts can now solve the puzzle: a permanent monument 
would be an exclusive use of the forum that unreasonably interferes with 
the government‘s ownership and the public‘s right to use.  Thus, such mo-
numents are not within the public‘s right to use public parks, streets, and 
other traditional public forums. 
